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Abstract
Economic complexity reflects the amount of knowledge that is embedded in the productive structure of an
economy. By combining tools from network science and econometrics, a robust and stable relationship between
a country’s productive structure and its economic growth has been established. Here we report that not only
goods but also services are important for predicting the rate at which countries will grow. By adopting a
terminology which classifies manufactured goods and delivered services as products, we investigate the influence
of services on the country’s productive structure. In particular, we provide evidence that complexity indices for
services are in general higher than those for goods, which is reflected in a general tendency to rank countries
with developed service sector higher than countries with economy centred on manufacturing of goods. By
focusing on country dynamics based on experimental data, we investigate the impact of services on the economic
complexity of countries measured in the product space (consisting of both goods and services). Importantly, we
show that diversification of service exports and its sophistication can provide an additional route for economic
growth in both developing and developed countries.
Introduction
The concept of economic complexity has been recently introduced [1–5] with the aim to reflect the amount
of knowledge that is embedded in the productive structure of an economy. By leveraging tools from network
science and econometrics, it has been documented that a robust and stable relationship between a country’s
productive structure and its economic growth exists [1–8]. Central to economic complexity is the description of
the relations between countries and products they export via a bipartite network (graph), along with the thereby
associated country-product (adjacency) matrix. By using the information contained in the country-product
matrix constructed according to Balassa’s [9] revealed comparative advantage (RCA), Hidalgo and Hausmann
proposed a method [3], also referred to as the method of reflections (MR), to derive complexity of countries
and products as the components of the fixed point solution of an iterative linear map. As a result, countries in
the international market are ranked and the difference in their competitiveness is measured based on their
complexity score. The method, similar in the spirit to pagerank algorithms, [10], is based on the hypothesis of a
linear relation (more precisely an arithmetic average) between the complexity of a product, and the complexity
(i.e. competitiveness) of its exporters.
Being motivated by the triangular structure of real data in the country-product matrix, in [11, 12] the
authors propose an approach which, as they argue, is more suited to reflect the ideas underlying the arguments
of a capability driven economic competitiveness. The novelty of the approach is in the introduction of fitness
as a measure for the economic complexity (i.e. competitiveness) of a country and, crucially, in the proposal of
a highly nonlinear relationship between the complexity of products and the fitness of countries producing them.
The nonlinear algorithm, also referred to as fitness-complexity method (FCM), and the resulting nonlinear
metric, are constructed on the premise that, although the competitiveness of a country is mostly determined
by the diversification of its exports, the complexity of a product is mostly determined by the complexity of the
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least competitive exporting countries. The FCM metric has been shown to be economically-grounded [11,12]
and to be effective in ranking countries and products by their importance in the network [13]. While the results
obtained with both methods generally support the relationship between a country’s productive structure and
its economic growth, they essentially introduce non-monetary and non-income-based measures for a country’s
economic complexity which uncover its hidden potential for development and growth.
The concept of economic complexity, as originally introduced, focuses on the role of goods exported by
a country for the country’s competitiveness and economic growth. While goods manufacturing and export
has traditionally been assumed to be the single most important indicator for the economic development of
countries, the role of services as drivers of growth has not been investigated to the same extent. As per capita
income increases, most countries witness a rising share of services in the total output, accounting to over 60
percent of global GDP in the last decade. The negligence of services in the policy and research debate may
stem from earlier observations that services are associated with low productivity and are merely inputs in
the production of goods. However, because of the revolution in technology (in particular information and
communication technology-ICT) and the rapid growth in transport and trade – with the advent of globalisation
and the internet age, as argued in [14], ”services are no longer exclusively an input for trade in goods but have
become a final export, i.e. a product for direct consumption”.
In view of these changes in the nature of services and their growing importance, we investigate their role in
the context of economic complexity. We adopt the nomenclature according to which products encompass both
goods and services, which is in line with current trends in economy where services are seen as products for direct
consumption. Following this convention, here we refer to the amount of knowledge that is required to produce
a good or to deliver a service as productive knowledge. This knowledge can vary enormously from one good to
the next or from one service to the next. In a previous attempt to extend the concept of economic complexity
to services, Hidalgo and Hausmann [4] used aggregated service data together with (highly) disaggregated goods
data to evaluate the complexity of countries and products. For the reason that service data was still not
disaggregate enough to be included in the complexity calculations, they quickly dismissed the service inclusion.
In order to circumvent the main problem associated with the inclusion of services in the model (which is the
lack of highly disaggregated data on services, as opposed to goods), here we take a different path and aggregate
goods data (to make it comparable to the service data), resulting in aggregated indices (i.e. indices based on
aggregated data) as measures for the complexity of products and countries. We thereby show that, although
some information is inevitably lost in the process of aggregation, the inclusion of services in the model provides
new insights for countries and products.
With the aim to investigate the impact of services on the countries’ productive structure, we present
results obtained by using both the linear method (MR) due to Hidalgo and Hausmann, and the nonlinear
method (FCM) due to Tachella et al. In addition, we address the important issue of convergence of nonlinear
algorithms when applied to nested networks (such as the bipartite contry-product network). The results of our
investigation, motivated by the recent reports [15] and [16] which relate the convergence of the FCM fitness and
complexity scores to the shape of the underlying nested country-product matrix, suggest that country-product
matrices obtained from real trade data often exhibit an ”unfavorable” structure resulting in some country
fitness and product complexity scores converging to zero. As a consequence, the stability of the induced country
and product rankings may be also affected. Motivated by these findings, we propose a new nonlinear method
(which may be seen as a modification of the fitness-complexity method), with tractable convergence. In the
following we refer to it as the modified-fitness complexity method (M-FCM). We thereby show that with the
introduced modification, fitness and complexity scores converge to values strictly greater than zero, resulting
in more stable country and product rankings. The details about the proposed metric and the convergence of
the algorithm are presented in the Materials and Methods section.
By performing an analysis of the new aggregated indices (obtained from aggregated goods and service data)
with both MR and M-FCM, we report that not only goods but also services are important for explaining
economic stability and growth. In fact, we provide evidence that complexity indices for services are in general
higher than those for goods, thus putting most services above in the product complexity ranking. As a result,
countries with developed service sector rank in general higher on the scale of aggregated economic complexity
indices, as compared to the case when ranking is performed based on disaggregated goods data only. While
there remains the non-monetary and non-income-based dimension of the productive knowledge as hidden
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potential for development and growth, we also show that there is a relation between the economic complexity
of a country measured in the product space (including goods and services) and the income per capita that
the country is able to generate measured with GDP per-capita adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity (PPP).
Importantly, our results suggest that growth in service exports and its sophistication can provide an additional
route for economic growth in both developing and developed countries. We argue that the converse may also
hold - the countries (including those with diversified goods portfolio, i.e. saturated goods space) which are
not able to accordingly populate the service space (i.e. diversify the service portfolio), may face diminishing
growth prospects. These conclusions, which can not be inferred from the analysis based solely on goods data,
may be more consistent with the ”perceived” economic situation in some countries than otherwise suggested by
the results in [3, 4] and [11,12].
This paper is organized as follows. Materials and Methods section starts by describing the trade data and
their adjustment for adequate comparison of goods and services. We proceed by summarizing the method
of reflections (MR) (and the induced linear metric) due to Hidalgo and Hausmann [3], together with the
nonlinear fitness-complexity method (FCM) (and the induced fitness-complexity metric) developed by Tacchella
et al. [11]. We also discuss the issues related to the convergence of the fitness-complexity algorithm and
the consequences of its’ application to aggregated product-country data. Here, we introduce the proposed
modification of the fitness complexity method (M-FCM) and study the convergence of the resulting country
fitness and product complexity scores. The Results and Discussion section consists of five parts. In the first
part we discuss the implications of data aggregation and inclusion of services to the model. In the second
part, we proceed by estimating few baseline regressions of growth on our aggregated complexity measures
which include both goods and services, and by comparing them with standard (disaggregated) complexity
measures, which account for goods only, and the simplest complexity measures that can be derived from the
country-product network. This allows us to study whether the aggregation of goods data and the inclusion of
services still yields country complexity/fitness indices that correlate significantly with future growth. In the
third part we look at something that the branch of Economic Complexity has widely eschewed until now -
the differences between the complexity of services and goods. We do this by comparing services and goods
rankings obtained through both linear and nonlinear methods. The fourth part of this section examines the
similarities between the aggregated and disaggregated complexity measures. Finally, in the last (fifth) part
of this section we present insights on the additional information that our aggregated metrics carry for the
economic potential of the countries, by providing examples for selected countries. The last section concludes
our findings and gives suggestions for future research.
Materials and Methods
Data
To analyse the association between countries and products we collect international trade data from various
sources. On the one hand, there are not many service datasets; even those that exist do not provide quality
data. The best one that can be found is the World Bank Trade in Services Database [17] based on the Extended
Balance of Payments Classification. The creators of this dataset consolidate multiple sources of bilateral trade
data in services and calculate the export trade flows of a reporter by using information on imports of the
partner country. By doing so, they identify and correct most of the inconsistencies present in the individual
sources for service trade data. Nevertheless, since the nature of the trade in services makes it difficult to collect
service data as accurately as goods data, it includes data mainly on two out of the four modes of trade in
services; cross-border trade flows and consumption abroad. A detailed description of the construction of the
dataset is provided in Appendix B of [18].
The lowest aggregation level that can be used appropriately is the 3-digit level. With this classification,
we recognize 12 different types of services: 11 being the standard service components in the IMF Balance of
Payments Manual, whereas the last service type that we include is EBOPS 983: Services not allocated category,
which serves as an approximation for all other services that could not be allocated in any of the standard
categories. We apply only one type of data sanitation, in the case when there are disaggregated country trade
flows, but no aggregated ones. Then, we sum the disaggregated trade flow and use it as a proxy of the 3-digit
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level service trade flow of the country.
Compared to service data, goods data is abundant and finely dissagregated. For the period of 1988-2000 we
use the Feenstra et al. [19] dataset from the Center for International Data which disaggregates the goods to
SITC rev.2 to 4-digit level. The dataset itself is an advanced version of the UN COMTRADE database as it
cleans the data from it in the same way as the Trade in Services Database does. We extend the dataset until
2010 by using the trade data provided by UN COMTRADE [20]. To make goods data comparable to service
data, we aggregate it to the Standard International Trade Classification(SITC) rev.2 1-digit level, thus ending
with 10 classes of goods. The resulting goods and services are presented in Table 1. For further cleaning of
unreliable or inadequately classified data, we restrict the dataset to the same countries that were used in the
Atlas of Economic Complexity [4, 21].
Even though that through this aggregated classification we end up with only 22 broad categories of products
(10 categories of goods and 12 categories of services) and a total of 130 countries, we believe that they are
detailed enough to provide new interesting facts about the complexity of goods, services and the countries
exporting them. Therefore, we utilize this classification to calculate our aggregated complexity measures.
For the baseline regression analysis of growth on the aggregated complexity metrics we use data on
GDP per capita at PPP in constant 2005 dollars, service value added, exports and population from the
World Bank World Development Indicators Database, whereas data from the Observatory of Economic
Complexity [21] is taken to individually calculate the Complexity Outlook Gain. These data are publicly
available at https://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.3404728.v1.
Methodology
Bipartite Network of Countries and Products: Following Hidalgo and Hausmann [1–5], based on the
collected data, we construct a bipartite network in which countries are connected to the products (here both
goods and services) they export. According to this representation, the existance of a link between a country and
a product in the bipartite network is related to the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) index introduced by
Balassa [9]. RCA is widely used in international economics for calculating the relative advantage or disadvantage
of a certain country in a certain class of goods or services as evidenced by trade flows. Formally, given a set
of C countries and P products, a set of RCA indices relating the countries and the products they export, is
defined as:
RCAij =
Eij/
∑
j Eij∑
iEij/
∑
i,j Eij
(1)
where Eij is the export of product j by country i, with i ∈ [C ] and j ∈ [P] (where [K ] denotes the set
{1, 2, . . . ,K }). As such, RCAij indicates whether the country i is significant exporter product j or not. For
example, RCAij > 1 indicates that country i’s share of product j (good or service) is larger than the product’s
Table 1. The included products and services
SITC Good EBOPS Service
0 Food and live Animals 205 Transportation
1 Beverages and Tobacco 236 Travel
2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 245 Communication
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 249 Construcion
4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 253 Insurance
5 Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 260 Financial Services
6 Manufactured goods 262 Computer and information
7 Machinery and transport equipment 266 Royalties and License fees
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 268 Other business services
9 Commodities not classified elsewhere 287 Personal services
291 Government services
983 Services not allocated
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share of the entire world market, thus ”revealing” a comparative advantage of country i with respect to product
j.
The entries of the country-product (adjacency) matrix M describing the links between countries and
products in the bipartite network (country-product space) may be related to the corresponding RCA index
in different ways. In the original representation according to [3,4], the Mij entry of the adjacency matrix is
described as:
Mij =
{
1, if RCAij ≥ 1
0, otherwise
(2)
When working with aggregated goods and service data, however, one may argue that computing a unique
RCA matrix by joining services and goods in one set of products may produce several biases, due to their
different nature and magnitude (volume) of trade. Although the concept of RCA already incorporates these
differences to a certain extent (by the normalization taking place in (1)), in the Supporting Information S1 we
also discuss an alternative RCA representation, where the RCA indices for goods and services are estimated
separately (by creating two different sets, one of goods and another of services), and are then concatenated
into a combined RCA matrix. Nonetheless, as we will see later on, the statistical results that we provide in
S1 suggest that the aggregated measures obtained through the representation with a unique RCA matrix
tend to be more appropriate, as they provide an economically more consistent interpretation of the countries’
productive structure.
Complexity of Countries and Products: The observations about the structure of the country-product
matrix have motivated a series of works, including [3,4] and [11,12] which interpret economic complexity by
special fundamental endowments, called capabilities. According to this interpretation, capabilities represent ”the
mixture of all available resources in a given economy and the features of the national social organization which
make possible the production and export of tradable products.” As the authors in [11,12] argue, capabilities
may also be seen as ”intangible assets which drive the development, the wealth and the competitiveness of a
country”. In practice they determine the complexity of a productive system as each product requires a specific
set of necessary capabilities which must be owned by a country in order to produce it and then to export it.
Due to the difficulty in categorizing and analysing capabilities quantitatively, exported products by each
country become in such a scenario the main proxy to infer the endowment of capabilities, i.e. the level of
complexity of a productive system. In this context, two simple measures may be introduced. The first measure,
called diversity, is the country’s degree in the bipartite network, which for country i reads:
di =
∑
j
Mij . (3)
The second measure, associated with products, is called ubiquity. For a product j, ubiquity is defined by the
number of countries exporting it:
uj =
∑
i
Mij (4)
Diversity and ubiquity are inversely related: higher diversity means that a country has an export basket with
many different products and, hence, it has a high amount of know-how; higher ubiquity means that a product
(good or a service) is included in many countries’ export baskets, and thus it needs fewer capabilities to be
produced. However, both diversity and ubiquity are simple graph characteristics (node degree) of the bipartite
network represented by the adjacency matrix M which carry limited information about the productive structure
of a country or complexity of a product as they do not take into account who else exports the same products.
As a result, a careful assessment is required if any of these simple measures is to be used for the explanation of
economic phenomena.
For these reasons, two approaches which extend over the concepts of diversity and ubiquity have been
introduced in the literature, the details of which we present in the following.
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The Method of Reflections (MR): The first approach, due to Hidalgo and Hausmann [3, 4], is organised
around a linear method, implicitly constructed on the premise that the number of a country’s capabilities
is equal to the average number of capabilities required by its exporting products, whereas the number of
capabilities required by a product is the average number of capabilities present in the countries that are
exporting it. The method is describes an iterative procedure with the aim to obtain measures for the complexity
of countries and products. According to the algorithm, the complexity scores of the country i, respectively
product j, as calculated after n iterations, are given by:{
ci,n =
1
di
∑
jMijpj,n−1
pj,n =
1
uj
∑
iMijci,n−1
(5)
where the initial conditions are ci,0 = di and pj,0 = uj , with di and uj denoting diversity, respectively ubiquity,
as defined in (3), respectively (4). By inserting the product (country) complexity relation into the country
(product) complexity, one can define ci,n (pj,n) as a linear transformation (map) of ci,n−2 (pj,n−2). When
written in vector form, the linear operator characterizing this linear map represents the transpose of an
ergodic Markov transition operator [12], implying that all ci,n and pj,n converge to a same constant with speed
of convergence proportional to the second largest right eigenvalue. For more details about the method of
refelections and its’ properties, please see [3, 12,22] and references therein.
It is important to note that the iterations can be evaded by generating two new matrices for countries and
products. Then, the capability measures can be obtained through ranking the nodes in each of these networks
by calculating the second largest eigenvectors of the matrices. Formally, for countries, define the matrix [C˜ii′ ]
as
C˜ii′ =
∑
j
MijMi′j
diuj
The resulting country complexity measure, called economic complexity index (ECI), is related to the normalized
eigenvector associated with the second largest eigenvalue of C˜
ECI =
~c− 〈~c〉
stdev(~c)
,
where 〈·〉 represents an average, stdev(·) stands for the standard deviation, and ~c is the eigenvector associated
with the second largest eigenvalue of C˜ = [C˜ii′ ].
By analogy, the resulting linear product complexity measure is named product complexity index (PCI) and
is defined by substituting the index of countries (i) with that for products (j) in the definitions above. In other
words, the linear PCI is obtained by analyzing the matrix connecting product j to product j′, according to the
number of countries that export both products:
P˜jj′ =
∑
i
MijMij′
diuj
Formally, PCI is given by
PCI =
~p− 〈~p〉
stdev(~p)
where ~p is the eigenvector of M˜jj′ associated with the second largest eigenvalue.
We implement this method to our aggregated representation of products to estimate the corresponding
aggregated ECI and aggregated linear PCI.
The Fitness-Complexity Method (FCM): The second approach we address, introduced in [11, 12], is
similar in respect of its’ aim to the approach due to Hidalgo and Hausmann. At the focus there is the concept of
fitness which, similar to ECI, serves as a measure for a country’s competitiveness. This method is based on an
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iterative procedure which couples the fitness of a country to the complexity of the products it exports. While
fitness, similarly to country complexity (i.e. ECI index) in MR, is defined to be proportional to the (weighted)
sum of the complexities of the exported products, the complexity of a product, in contrast to MR, is now no
longer defined as the average fitness of the countries producing it. Instead, a strong nonlinear relationship
between the complexity of an exported product and the competitiveness of its producers is assumed. The
nonlinear map is formally described by the following set of (iterative) equations:c˜i,n =
∑
jMijpj,n−1
p˜j,n =
1∑
iMij
1
ci,n−1
−→
{
ci,n =
c˜i,n
〈c˜i,n〉
pj,n =
p˜j,n
〈p˜j,n〉 ,
(6)
where c˜i,n and p˜j,n are, respectively, the intermediate values of the fitness (i.e. complexity) of the country i and
the (nonlinear) complexity index of a product j, as calculated after n iterations of the algorithm. After each
step, the intermediate values are normalized to ci,n and pj,n by separately dividing them with the corresponding
averages over all countries and products, i.e. 〈c˜i,n〉 and 〈p˜j,n〉. Different to MR, here the initial conditions are
given by c˜i,0 = 1 and p˜j,0 = 1, for all i and j.
Depending on the possible values that the elements of the M matrix take ( binary vs. real-valued), two
different definitions of fitness are defined in [11,12]: the first one, denoted as intensive fitness (IF), is obtained
from the binary representation of M , as presented in (2); the second one, denoted as extensive fitness (EF), is
based on a non-binary (i.e. weighted representation) of the elements of the country-product matrix M . While
there are instances where the use of EF over IF may be beneficial, EF is, by construction, more appropriate for
capturing the short-term competitiveness of a nation, rather than its’ long-term competitiveness and robustness
of the productive structure [11, 12] . For these reasons, in our analysis we will concentrate on the intensive
fitness, with the remark that the results easily generalize to the case when the extensive fitness is used as a
complexity measure.
An attractive property of the fitness-complexity method is that the resulting metrics converges to a
non-trivial unique fixed point after several iterations. However, it may happen that in the steady state the
complexity (fitness) indices ci for some of the countries converge to zero which, due to the nonlinear relation,
implies convergence to zero of the complexity indices pj of some of their exported products [15, 16]. In general,
this occurrence may be seen as a drawback of the nonlinear fitness-complexity method since, in that case,
it fails to compute any differences among certain countries and products. Whether there will be countries
and products whose complexity scores converges to zero, depends solely on the shape of the country-product
matrix M , i.e. on the structure of the trade data (see [15] for more detailed discussion). In line with this
observation, the results of our investigation with real data show that in most of the years the matrices that
we construct from aggregated goods and service data have, indeed, an ”unfavorable” shape (according to the
findings in [15, 16]), resulting in some of the complexity indices for countries and products converging to zero.
Hence, the direct application of FCM to our dataset may not be appropriate, requiring an alternative approach.
In order to deal with this weakness, and, consequently, to accommodate FCM to our type of data, in the
following we propose a modification of the method.
Modified-Fitness-Complexity Method: (M-FCM) Here we define a modification of the nonlinear
Fitness-Complexity Method as follows:{
c˜i,n =
∑
jMijpj,n−1
p˜j,n =
1∑
iMij(Nc−ci,n−1)
−→
{
ci,n =
c˜i,n
〈c˜i,n〉
pj,n =
p˜j,n
〈p˜j,n〉
(7)
The difference with the original nonlinear method is in the equation for p˜j,n where we substitute the term
1
ci,n−1
with (Nc − ci,n−1), where Nc is the number of countries (the number of rows in the M matrix). We
argue that, with this modification, the main flavour of the fitness-complexity method is still preserved. Indeed,
here, as in the original method, the complexity of a product is still (mostly) determined by the complexity of
the least competitive exporting countries.
As a matter of fact, our proposed modification may be seen as a second order approximation of the original
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nonlinear method since the Taylor series expansion of 1/ci,n−1 at the point Nc/2 is proportional to (Nc−ci,n−1):
1
ci,n−1
=
2
Nc
− 4(ci,n−1 −
Nc
2 )
N2c
+O((ci,n−1 − Nc
2
)2)
≈ 4
N2c
(Nc − ci,n−1) ∝ (Nc − ci,n−1),
which converges as long as |Nc − ci,n−1| < Nc.
Yet, the introduced modification has an additional fine property as it yields complexity scores (for both
countries and products) that always converge to strictly positive, finite values. In order to prove this property,
we write the steady-state solutions of ci, c˜i, pj , and p˜j :
c˜i =
∑
j
Mijpj ; (8)
p˜j =
1∑
iMij (Nc − ci) ;
(9)
ci =
c˜i
〈c˜i〉i ; (10)
pj =
p˜j
〈p˜j〉j . (11)
It is easy to see, starting from the initial conditions that c˜i,n > 0, p˜j,n > 0, ci,n > 0, and pj,n > 0. Therefore,
c˜i ≥ 0, p˜j ≥ 0, ci ≥ 0, and pj ≥ 0. Note that due to the normalization process, after each step we have
Nc =
∑
i ci,n =
∑
i ci for each n, and the total number of products in the network (the number of columns in
the M matrix) is Np =
∑
j pj,n =
∑
j pj for each n. We assume that each country exports at least one product
(di =
∑
jMij > 0) and each product is exported by at least one country (uj =
∑
iMij > 0).
From
∑
iMijci ≥ 0 it follows that∑
i
Mij(Nc − ci) = Ncuj −
∑
i
Mijci ≤ Ncuj
Hence
1∑
iMij(Nc − ci)
≥ 1
Ncuj
> 0 (12)
since uj > 0. Therefore, from Eqs (8), (9), (10), and (11) we have c˜i > 0, p˜j > 0, ci > 0, and pj > 0. From
(12), and since
∑
iMij > 0 and Nc =
∑
i ci, we have ci < Nc. Thus steady-state solutions are also finite.
Due to these favorable characteristics of M-FCM, we will apply it instead of the originally proposed FCM
for the computation of the fitness-complexity measures based on aggregated data. We will refer to the resulting
indices as aggregated IF and aggregated nonlinear PCI. Additionally, we will also use M-FCM to compute the
complexity measures for disaggregated goods data, a step which is required in the process of evaluation of the
impact that services and data aggregation have on the country productive structure.
Results and Discussion
Data Aggregation and Inclusion of Services: Implications
Before we proceed with a detailed analysis of the characteristics of the aggregated complexity measures and
present country and product rankings based on these measures, in this part we provide an initial intuition
about how the aggregation of goods and the inclusion of services may affect economic complexity indicators
and country ranking.
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Data aggregation: Intuitively, as data aggregation results in reduction of the number of products (now 22
in total, including services), any change in the coefficients of the adjacency matrix (i.e. introduction/deletion
of a link in the bipartite network), affects the overall structure more significantly than in the case of the
original model with 774 disaggregated goods. Indeed, the process of goods aggregation leads to distortions in
the distribution of diversity among countries. The impact of this effect is evident when diversity of countries
based on aggregated goods is compared to diversity obtained on the basis on disaggregated goods (services
are excluded to quantify the effect of goods aggregation only). For example, in the SITC 4-digit classification
developed countries such as Germany, Italy and the United States have the most diverse export basket, whereas
in the SITC 1-digit classification they are replaced in the rankings with not as developed countries. While
this may be interpreted as a disadvantage of goods aggregation, we note that diversity is still only a first
order approximation of country complexity. Nevertheless, when services are added to the picture, the overall
aggregated diversity profile resembles a lot more the diversity profile with disaggregated goods, as the diversity
of developed countries is increased by the inclusion of services in the model. As in the case with disaggregated
goods, countries exporting primarily natural resources are also the least diversified in this new model of
aggregated products. Interestingly, when it comes to ubiquity, the above effect is less pronounced, as goods
aggregation yields more predictable results with respect to the ubiquity scores of the newly obtained aggregated
goods. For example, chemicals and machinery are the least ubiquitous in the aggregated goods classification
(when services are excluded), which is expected having in mind that in the disaggregated classification, goods
coming from these classes are among the least ubiquitous in general. When services are included the distribution
of goods ubiquity remains relatively unchanged, with the only difference that each aggregated good becomes
rather ubiquitous at the expense of services. Now, in the overall model of aggregated products, services such as
Royalties and Finance are least ubiquitously exported in almost each year.
With a smaller adjacency matrix (i.e. a smaller number of products) as a result of aggregation, country
rankings are also expected to be affected. Indeed, small changes in the RCA index may result in a transition
from 0 to 1 in the adjacency matrix (or vice verse). As a consequence, country rankings based on both
aggregated ECI and aggregated IF are more volatile (susceptible to higher variations over time) when goods are
aggregated, compared to the original findings in [3, 4] (for ECI), and in [11, 12] (for IF) based on disaggregated
goods data. This observation is consistent with the results presented later in this section, where the dynamics
of country rankings is analyzed over time.
Definitely, in the process of aggregation, some of the information revealed by the analyses based on
disaggregated goods data is inevitably lost since some countries lose the revealed comparative advantage that
they previously had in some goods (when goods were disaggregated), which is reflected in more profound
changes in their overall export basket structure and their rankings. While this may be seen as a weakness of the
model relying on aggregated goods data, we recall the discussion that, in the absence of finer (i.e. disaggregated
service data), the most plausible way to include services in the model is to aggregate goods data to a level
comparable with available service data.
The role of services: To illustrate the effect of the inclusion of services in the model, in Fig. 1a we present
a simple visualization of the country-product network for the year 2005.
According to this representation, goods and services are located at the center and countries are grouped
into regions (continents). The network consists of 116 countries, 10 products, 12 services, 448 links connecting
countries and goods, and 238 links connecting countries and services when RCAij > 1. Initially, the difference
between the number of connections of services and goods suggests that there is a significant margin between
their complexity. This is also supported by the information contained in the binary M matrix for the same
year after rows and columns are sorted according to decreasing diversity and ubiquity, as displayed in Fig.
1b. We observe that the matrix preserves the triangular structure present in [2], thus implying that ubiquity
and diversity are also inversely related in the model with aggregated goods and services. A more thorough
examination shows that, among the countries, United Kingdom and the Netherlands have the highest diversity
(13), while Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela are least diversified with comparative advantage in only 1
product (Mineral fuels). The least ubiquitously exported products are Financial services, while Food and live
animals chiefly for food are mostly exported by the countries.
By separating the diversity scores of services and goods, we discover additional information about the
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Fig 1. The Aggregated Country-Product Network. a) Visualizes the country-product network for
2005. Services are given in blue and goods in red. Country nodes are colored according to the continents they
belong, Europe is in green, Asia in purple, Africa in yellow, and nodes representing American countries are in
cyan. b) Shows the M matrix. Here rows represent countries, ordered accordingly to their diversity, while
columns represent products ordered according their ubiquity.
difference in the productive capabilities embedded in services and goods. Developed and highly diversified
countries, such as United Kingdom (10), Switzerland (9) and the United States (9) have the most diverse
service export baskets, whereas not as developed and diversified countries, specifically Kenya (8) and Lebanon
(8), have the highest goods diversity. Even though, this diversity analysis should be taken with caution since
diversity alone is only a first order approximation of country complexity (fitness) and, as such, may not
very informative for evaluating the complexity of a productive system, the results can serve as an indication
for post-industrialization [23] - the process in which developed economies undergo a change from relying on
production of goods to provision of services. Indeed, as we will see later in this section, complexity rankings
performed on the basis of aggregated goods data recognize even bigger differences between service-oriented and
goods-oriented developed economies.
Altogether, the effects of data aggregation and inclusion of services significantly impact the picture of the
productive structure of the countries. In the following we will further investigate the impact of services on
the productive structure and will discuss how their addition in the model may help us extract new valuable
information about both the long-term and the short-term economic situation of nations.
Economic Complexity as Indicator of Future Growth
The significance of economic complexity stems from the observation that the productive capabilities possessed
by a country carry information about its long term potential. Ergo, the information contained in the adjacency
matrix describing the bipartite country-product network, may be used to predict country’s future growth. In
this context, the performance of the method of reflections has been extensively evaluated through econometric
tools in [3, 4]. Similarly, the proponents of the fitness-complexity method also argue that the economic
complexity indicators influence economic growth [11,12]. In order to resolve inconsistencies appearing when
standard regressions are used for growth prediction, in [8] it is debated that there is a heterogeneous pattern of
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evolution of country dynamics in the fitness-income plane. Depending on whether a country has a lower or
higher level of income compared to expectations based on its level of fitness, two regimes are observed which
correspond to very different predictability features for the evolution of countries: in the former regime one
finds a strong predictable pattern, while the second regime exhibits a very low predictability. As a result, the
authors propose a selective predictability scheme which incorporates concepts from dynamical systems to deal
with the heterogeneity of the evolution pattern.
According to these observations, we argue that one may position the complexity approach in the middle
between two economic concepts - one which traditionally describes economic systems in purely GDP-oriented
terms, and another which substitutes GDP with new economic indicators [24,25]. With this respect, we favor
the stand presented in [8] according to which, instead of simply substituting monetary based information (such
as GDP) with new, alternative indicators [24, 25], it is more appropriate to complement GDP-based measures
with new dimensions. The role of GDP thus remains important in our analysis, with the remark that the
results should be interpreted based on the understanding that the country GDP (respectievly GDP per capita)
is only a part of the picture or, more precisely, only one of the parameters in the multi-dimensional model.
While regression analysis may not be appropriate for prediction of future growth, it still provides a simple
solution for inferring the validity of the expected positive relationship between growth and the aggregated
complexity measures. In particular, we believe that if complexity measures are supposed to provide information
about some dependent variable (i.e. long-term growth), then they should be significant and robust explanatory
variables in any correct econometric model. Therefore, we stick to the regression analysis, and construct
three competing econometric models in which the long term growth, controlled for possible other effects, is
regressed on the aggregated and disaggregated complexity measures, as well as on the aggregated diversity
(the regressions with the disaggregated ECI can be seen as a partial reproductions of the growth regressions
presented in [4]). We demonstrate that the aggregation of goods and the addition of services in the model
still produces complexity/fitness indices which act as robust explanatory variables of growth. In addition, the
regression results indicate that the obtained indices provide better approximation of the variations in the long
term growth than aggregated diversity.
In the following we provide details for the analysis performed under the linear (MR) model given by (5),
and under the nonlinear (FCM) model (more precisely the modification thereof, M-FCM), as given by (7),
while in Supporting Information S1 we assess the robustness of our results. There, we add the initial export
of goods and services (as a percent of GDP), the initial population, and the initial value added of services
(again, as a percent of GDP) in the regression model. Each of these is related to both economic complexity and
growth, and therefore they can be interpreted as potentially omitted variables. As such, these variables can
serve for assessing the robustness of the regression analysis. Nonetheless, as shown in Supporting Information
S1, in all of the addressed cases, the aggregated complexity measures remain significant explanatory variables
of growth, thus removing the suspect of present bias.
MR Regressions: We examine the relationship between the aggregated complexity measures and long term
economic growth by estimating the following panel regression with fixed time effects:
gi,t = α+ βci,t + φ
′Xi,t + ηt + i,t
where t = 1988, 1998 is period notation. The dependent variable gi,t is measured as the ten-year GDP (PPP)
per capita growth of country i, between 1988-1998 and 1998-2008, i.e gi,t = log
(
GDPi,t+10
GDPi,t
)
. We focus on this
period as it is longest for which service data is available. Moreover, this way we are consistent with the ’original’
regression analysis performed in [4], thus allowing for direct comparison. The coefficient β is of particular
interest to us as it is an estimate of the marginal effect of ci,t, the economic complexity of the country at the
initial time t; Xi,t is a vector of three control variables, φ the corresponding vector of parameters; whereas ηt is
the time effect and it is the error term. The three control variables that are included are the log of the initial
GDP (PPP) per capita, the increase in natural resource exports and the initial complexity outlook index (COI)
of the country. The first one helps us explain the catch-up effect, which states that the developing countries
have potential to grow at faster rates, when compared to the developed ones. Since economic complexity does
not capture the effects of exporting natural resources, we include the increase in natural resource exports in
constant dollars as a share of initial GDP (natural resources match SITC categories 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 and 68, same
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as Sachs and Warner [26]) as the second control variable. In addition, in every estimation, ci,t is accompanied
by the COI index that measures how many different products are near a country’s set of productive capabilities,
according to the capability-driven model for economic complexity. The role of this index, according to [4],
stems by the fact that ”the countries with a low complexity outlook have few nearby products and will find it
difficult to acquire new capabilities and increase their economic complexity”.
Table 2 provides the results from the performed regressions for the effect that the country complexity
measure obtained through the MR method has on the economic growth. The first column shows the estimated
parameters when growth is regressed only on the first two control variables, while the second adds the aggregated
ECI and COI to the regression. From the regression it can be easily concluded that the aggregated ECI is a
significant predictor of long term economic growth at any level. The third column replaces the aggregated ECI
with the disaggregated ECI. As a consequence, the value of R2 increases almost by 10 percentage points. In
order to test which model would be preferred based on the data, in the fourth column we combine the two
indices (See Brooks [27] p. 159 for the procedure). In this model the aggregated ECI is no longer significant,
implying that the model with the disaggregated ECI is preferred. This is no coincidence since the aggregated
ECI is constructed by distinguishing fewer number of goods, and thus it contains less information about
the productive capabilities embedded in them. In the last two columns we compare the performance of the
aggregated ECI and the simplest measure for productive capabilities, the aggregated diversity. Column V
suggests that the aggregated diversity significantly explains the changes in growth only if the critical level is
above 10 percent, while column V I states that the aggregated ECI is a better representative of the data. More
precisely, when the aggregated ECI and the aggregated diversity are combined in one regression, the coefficient
of aggregated diversity becomes negative and loses significance, whereas the significance of the aggregated ECI
remains. This conclusion is justified even though the colinearity between these variables is very high, and it is
well known that if two highly colinear variables are included as explanatory variables in a regression, it may
happen that none of them remain significant (we measure the level of colinearity as the Pearson correlation
controlled for the log of the initial GDP per capita, natural resource exports and COI, which is 0.66).
Table 2. Aggregated Economic Complexity Index and Growth.
Dependent Variable: Growth in GDP pc
1988-1998, 1998-2008
Variable (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Income per capita, logs −0.027∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.014) (0.015)
Increase in NR exports 0.311∗ 0.325∗ 0.311∗∗ 0.306∗∗ 0.304∗ 0.326∗
(0.166) (0.166) (0.132) (0.133) (0.165) (0.160)
Initial aggregated ECI 0.042∗∗∗ −0.008 0.045∗∗
(0.015) (0.016) (0.022)
Initial COI 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.005∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Initial ECI 0.118∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.026)
Initial aggregated Diversity 0.010∗ −0.002
(0.006) (0.009)
Constant 0.468∗∗∗ 0.631∗∗∗ 1.187∗∗∗ 1.189∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗ 0.637∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.134) (0.175) (0.175) (0.117) (0.139)
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210
R2 0.202 0.239 0.334 0.334 0.224 0.239
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Liberia in both periods and Turkmenistan in 1998 were excluded since they were extreme outliers.
Standard errors clustered by cross-section shown in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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FCM Regressions: In the original works which introduced the fitness-complexity method [11, 12], the
authors use the Harmonized System 2007 nomenclature for goods in order to estimate the (disaggregated)
intensive fitness (IF), which is slightly different from the one used in [3,4] and in our work. Moreover, as we
noted in the Materials and Methods section, the FCM in its original version may result in complexity indices
converging to zero values, thus failing to display any significant results in typical regression analysis. In order
to deal with this issue, and with the aim to produce a fair comparison when different goods nomenclature is
used, we re-estimate the disaggregated IF with the modified fitness-complexity method (M-FCM), by relying
on the SITC rev.2 4-digit classification. Then, in Table 3 we redo the growth regressions with the logs of the
estimated aggregated IF. Afterwards, we compare its performance with the logs of the disaggregated IF and
the aggregated diversity. The results are in line to the ones obtained with the MR method: first, the log of
the aggregated IF is a significant explanatory variable of growth at any level; second, the econometric model
which includes the aggregated IF performs worse than the disaggregated IF. The only difference appears in the
model in which we compare the performance of the aggregated IF and the aggregated diversity, where now
both variables are significant (although the aggregated diversity is significant only at 10%). However, as in the
case of the comparison between the aggregated ECI and the aggregated diversity, in this combined model the
relationship between aggregated diversity and growth becomes negative. This observation appears because
the collinearity between the aggregated IF and aggregated diversity is also very high (they have a Pearson
correlation of 0.89 when controlling for for the log of the initial GDP per capita, natural resource exports and
COI). Altogether, it implies that the aggregated IF is a more robust variable than aggregated diversity, when
it comes to the explanation of the long term changes in income. This allows us to conclude that the prediction
model based on the log of aggregated IF performs better than the model based on aggregated diversity.
To make a more adequate presentation of the marginal effects of both aggregated ECI and the log of the
aggregated IF, we standardize their estimated coefficients by multiplying them by the ratio of the standard
deviations of the independent and dependent variables [28]. The standardized coefficients imply that, a one
standard deviation increase in the aggregated ECI is associated with an increase in the growth variable equal to
18.6% of a standard deviation in that variable, while a one standard deviation increase in the log of aggregated
Table 3. Aggregated Intensive Fitness and Growth.
Dependent Variable: Growth in GDP pc
1988-1998, 1998-2008
Variable (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Income per capita, logs −0.027∗∗ −0.045∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗ −0.067∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.015)
Increase in NR exports 0.311∗ 0.312∗ 0.321∗∗ 0.319∗∗ 0.304∗ 0.311∗
(0.166) (0.162) (0.155) (0.156) (0.165) (0.160)
Initial aggregated IF,logs 0.046∗∗∗ −0.014 0.107∗∗
(0.017) (0.021) (0.042)
Initial COI 0.004∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.005∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Initial IF, logs 0.086∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.029)
Initial aggregated Diversity 0.010∗ −0.026∗
(0.006) (0.015)
Constant 0.468∗∗∗ 0.692∗∗∗ 0.900∗∗∗ 0.884∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗ 0.888∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.137) (0.158) (0.151) (0.117) (0.181)
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210
R2 0.202 0.241 0.296 0.297 0.224 0.254
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: For consistency with the aggregated ECI regressions, Liberia in both periods and Malawi in 1998 were
excluded from the sample. Standard errors clustered by cross-section shown in parentheses. ***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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IF increases the same growth variable by 20.4% of its standard deviation. On the other hand, the disaggregated
ECI and the log of the disaggregated IF estimate that the marginal effect of country complexity over growth is,
respectively, 55.7 percent and 37.3 percent. From this, it can be said that the aggregated complexity measures
have similar effect on economic growth, and, in addition with the nearly identical R2, it appears that the
aggregation and the inclusion of services lessen the discrepancy between the marginal effect and the explanatory
power of the two metrics. More importantly, the magnitude of the standardized coefficients is only slightly
smaller than the increase in natural resource exports (which is between 25% and 27% of a standard deviation
in both regressions), thus allowing us to conclude that an increase in the aggregated economic complexity has
an economically large effect.
While the performed regressions are appropriate for capturing the explanatory potential of the complexity
indices, they are not appropriate for growth prediction due to several reasons. First, we recall that the R2 is a
standardized measure, bounded between 0 and 1, which estimates how much of the variance of the dependent
variable can be explained by the model. If the regression is supposed to be used for predictions, it should
have an R2 very close to 1. However, in each of the performed regressions this measure is fairly low (the
best performer is the disaggregated ECI with an estimate of 0.33). In fact, as Table 2 and Table 3 show,
aggregated country complexity and aggregated diversity have similar prediction power, which is an additional
argument against the regression analysis. As discussed in [8, 11, 12], this type of regression analysis fails to
spot the heterogeneous features that change over time and between countries. We conclude that the use of the
complexity measures for prediction requires more sophisticated methods (see [8] for related discussion).
Services vs. Goods
Here we investigate the dynamics of the aggregated Product Complexity Index estimated through both MR
and M-FCM. We begin our analysis by presenting a visualization of the aggregated product complexity ranking
in Fig. 2. It can be easily noticed that most services have higher complexity than goods. This result can be
statistically supported by regressing the aggregated PCI against a dummy variable that captures the effect of
services and fixing the time effects:
pjt = µg + ∆µsDs + ηt + jt
where pjt is either the linear (estimated through MR) or the nonlinear (estimated through M-FCM) product
complexity index for good or service j at time t, µg is the average good complexity, ∆µs is an estimate of
the additional average service complexity; Ds is the dummy variable; ηt the time effects and jt is the error
component.
The results of the regressions are provided in Table 4. From column I it can be concluded that for the
method of reflections, after controlling for the year, the average service complexity is higher than the average
good complexity by 1.59 standard deviations. The modified fitness-complexity method produces similar
results, as presented in column II – the average service complexity is 2.77 times higher than the average good
complexity.
Table 4. PCI Regressions.
Dependent Variable: Product Complexity Index
1995-2010
Variable (I) (II)
Service dummy 1.594∗∗∗ 0.901∗∗∗
(0.225) (0.233)
Constant −0.870∗∗∗ 0.508∗∗∗
(0.201) (0.009)
Observations 352 352
R2 0.660 0.268
Year FE Yes Yes
Note: Standard errors clustered by cross-section shown in parentheses. ***p < 0.01
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Fig 2. Evolution of services and goods complexity (1995-2010). a) Product ranking estimated
through MR. b)Same as a) only estimated through M-FCM. a-b Services: blue, goods: red.
In the spirit of a capability-driven productive structure, it seems that services require more capabilities for
their delivery. But why is this the case?
As Hausmann and Hidalgo [2] argue, the production of a certain good requires the country to have the
necessary capabilities associated with it. In other words, a link between a country and a product (be it a good
or a service) exists if the country has the capabilities required to produce it. The framework which relates
products and capabilities may be used to qualitatively describe complexity of services. In particular, by looking
at the bottom of the product complexity rankings we find that according to MR, SITC 3: Mineral Fuels,
Lubricants and related materials is the least complex product in each year, while according to the M-FCM
the least complex products are SITC 0: Food and live animals and SITC 2: Crude materials, inedible, except
fuels. Disaggregating them, we can get various raw materials whose production does not rely as much on the
presence of capabilities, as it does on the geographical luck of the country.
By moving further up in the rankings we observe that in the majority of the examination period SITC 7:
Machinery and transport equipment represents the most complex aggregated good. For a country to be able to
produce machineries such as combustion engines or x-ray equipment, besides using natural resources as inputs,
it has to combine other capabilities, for example the capabilities embedded in its workers. The positioning of
the linear aggregated products is well reflected in the SITC rev.2 4-digit ranking provided in the Observatory
of Economic Complexity [21].
At the very top we can find services such as EBOPS 266: Royalties and Licence fees. We believe that, in the
sense of [2], the production of these services requires the combination of the complex knowledge embedded in
the goods and in the other services that a country produces. In addition, we argue that as a country’s product
space becomes saturated with goods, the contribution of economic complexity to future economic growth begins
to decrease, which is in line with the observations in [4]. In this context, our results suggest that probably the
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easiest way for maintaining the effect of the evolution of the productive structure is by introducing services
whose set of required capabilities is similar, but a little more complex; for instance, developing intangible assets
such as patents requires the presence of sophisticated machineries and an additional input of capabilities. It
is worth noting that our argument is in accordance with the conclusions in [18] where it was indicated that
services tend to grow in importance for the economy as the level of a country’s development rises.
Aggregated vs. Disaggregated Metrics
On the on hand, the ability of the aggregated complexity measures (with goods and services included in the
model) to significantly explain the long term growth of the countries implies that these measures are somewhat
similar to the disaggregated complexity measures (obtained with goods only). Yet, the conclusion from the
previous section that services are, in general, more complex than goods indicates that the aggregated metrics
provide different information about the present competitiveness and the future potential of the countries. In
order to get a better presentation of the (dis)similarity of the two type of metrics and to assess the effects of
goods aggregation and inclusion of services on the productive structure of the countries, in Fig. 3 we show
the yearly Spearman Rank correlation between the country rankings based on aggregated (with goods and
services) and disaggregated (goods) data. It can be observed that there is a strong correlation between the
aggregated and disaggregated metrics until 2008 (Only in 2004 the correlation between the aggregated and
disaggregated IF is under 0.7). While this similarity can be used as an evidence that the aggregated metrics
are a good approximation of the productive structure (if we take the disaggregated metrics as benchmark), the
small distinction reveals the different information which they produce. These differences, we believe, can be
attributed more to the inclusion of services in the model than to the aggregation of goods. Our reasoning is
founded on the conclusion from the previous section that services are, in general, more complex than goods and
that the ranking of aggregated goods complexity exhibits nearly the same structure as the disaggregated goods
complexity ranking [21], which means that in the aggregated rankings service-oriented economies become more
complex at the expense of the goods-oriented economies. This conclusion is additionally supported by the
procedure of the two methods - both of them, due to the initial aggregated diversity and ubiquity profiles, in an
iterative manner discover even bigger differences in the complexity score of service-oriented and goods-oriented
countries (this characteristic is more pronounced in M-FCM).
In the aftermath of the Global Crisis in 2008, we observe a decrease in the correlation between the aggregated
and the disaggregated indices (both for ECI and IF), dropping under 0.65 in 2009 and under 0.55 in 2010. This
suggests that the Financial crisis and the following recession (accompanied by the European Sovereign-Debt
crisis), had a more profound impact on the productive structure of the world economies. It is our belief that
this impact can be attributed to the decreased volume in trade [29] that was more pronounced in goods than in
services [30]. As a result, the complexity of some of the the aggregated goods increased (as shown in Fig. 2). To
explain this effect, we need to recall the iterative relation between complexity of countries and products. The
main argument comes from the fact that the goods exports were not affected in the same way for all countries:
some of the countries managed to pertain same or similar level of goods export; others, however, exhibited
sharper decrease in their exports. Correspondingly, some of the goods that were produced by the majority of
the countries before the crisis, were now produced by less countries. As a consequence, the complexity of the
affected goods increased, yielding an effective increase of the complexity of their major producers. This process
eventually led to an increase of the complexity of some of the countries (those less affected by the crisis), at
the expense of the decrease in the complexity of other countries (those most affected more by the crisis in the
global goods trade).
These changes were additionally fueled by the nature of some of the service types that we classified. In
particular, we observe that in light of financial crises, the financial services (which are usually the most complex
services according to our model) are subject to a major decrease in trade, thus significantly affecting complexity
indices and country rankings. It is also possible that the austerity measures imposed in some countries with
the aim to handle the Sovereign-Debt crisis, affect service exports in a different way that they affect goods
exports [31]. The validation of this argument, however, requires a deeper analysis which is out of the scope of
this work. In any case, services such as finance, information and royalties still remained the most complex
products, and hence the countries which maintained a comparative advantage in these products, the most
competitive ones. As a matter of fact, as we will see later on, the same countries were able to recover faster
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Fig 3. Correlation between the aggregated and disaggregated metrics. a) Yearly Spearman
correlation between the aggregated and disaggregated estimated through MR. b) same as a) for the
aggregated and disaggregated estimated through M-FCM.
from the recession and to display significant progress after it. We discuss this argument in more detail in the
following section.
Country Specifics
Country Dynamics: As a means to provide a more detailed analysis of the country rankings, in Fig. 4 we
display the dynamics of the aggregated and disaggregated ECI and IF. Thereby, we highlight several countries
(Estonia, Malaysia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (USA)) with
different economic attributes. Here countries are ranked according to their ECI (Fig. 4a), aggregated ECI
(Fig. 4b, IF (Fig. 4c) and aggregated IF (Fig. 4d) evaluated between 1995 and 2010. Due to limited data, the
ranking includes only 94 countries.
It can be noticed that the country complexity rankings produced through aggregated data are more volatile
than the ones produced taking account disaggregated data. We believe that both the aggregation of the data
and the nature of the services are behind this observation. The argumentation goes along the observation
that, although complexity indices do not account for the volume of trade, they still account for its presence.
We recall that the aggregated ECI and IF rely on aggregated data which effectively decreases the number of
products and, by that, the dimension of the adjacency country-product matrix. With this, the disappearance
of a link or the occurrence of new link in the country-product matrix due to data variations has a far bigger
impact on the complexity indices than in the case with disaggregated goods data.
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Fig 4. Country Dynamics (1995-2010). a) ECI rankings movement of the countries. We thereby
highlight China, Estonia, Ethiopia, Malaysia, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and
the United States. b) Same for aggregated ECI. c) IF rankings movement of the countries. d) Same for
aggregated IF. a-d Three digit iso codes are used as country abbreviations.
The years after 2008 are characterized by an even larger volatility in the country rankings which, we believe,
cannot be attributed solely to the aggregation of data. Based on these results we argue that the aggregated
measures are most probably more susceptible to economic crises (as compared to the disaggregated ones),
resulting in more frequent but also bigger changes in the rankings.
Countries with developed service sector: As observed from the presented results, the inclusion of services
affects significantly the complexity indices and the rankings of individual countries. Specifically, the fact that
the services appear to be on average more complex than goods (i.e. rank higher on the product complexity
scale), positions (in general) countries with developed service sector higher in the economic complexity ranking.
This holds in particular for countries such as USA and UK. According to Fig. 4, until 2008 UK is ranked higher
in both aggregated rankings (aggregated ECI/aggregated IF), as compared to the disaggregated (goods only)
rankings. After 2008 we observe a drop in its aggregated ECI rankings which, interestingly, is not reflected in
the aggregated IF rankings.
We offer the following heuristic explanation for this discrepancy. First, we observe that in the aftermath of
the financial crisis there are substantial changes in the structure of the M matrix, which now may be described
as being ”more uniform”. This is to say that, as a result of the crisis, there is reduction in the differences
between the countries’ export baskets. This feature can be deduced from Fig. 5 where we display the yearly
Box plots for the aggregated ECI and the log of aggregated IF. Specifically, we observe an increase in the
median complexity and a significant decrease in the interquartile range in the yearly distributions of both
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Fig 5. Changes in the distribution of complexity. a) Box plots for the aggregated ECI (1995-2010) b)
Same for aggregated IF. a-b In each year, red horizontal lines indicate the median, whereas the blue horizontal
lines are, respectively, the first and third quartile of the distribution. Red crosses indicate outliers. They are
identified as being observations which are, either greater than the sum of the third quartile and 3/2 of the
interquantile range or less than the difference between the first quartile and 3/2 of the interquantile range.
These thresholds are displayed with black horizontal lines.
complexity metrics. These changes in the distribution, are more pronounced in the MR model, due to the
linear relation between the complexity of a product and the complexity of its exporters. Consequently, there is
a decrease of the complexity indices (ECI) for the countries whose product portfolio includes sophisticated
services, which is eventually reflected in the complexity rankings. In the FCM model, on the other hand, the
complexity of a product exhibits a nonlinear relation with the complexity (i.e. fitness) of its exporters, being
mostly dominated by the fitness of the least complex exporter. The key point is that, with the structure of M
now being more uniform, the variations of the complexity (fitness) indices of the countries decreases. However,
on average, the change in the fitness of the least complex exporters is less pronounced than the change of the
fitness of the most complex exporters. In other words, it seems that, compared to MR, the FCM dynamics is
less affected by short term economic fluctuations.
During the crisis, UK entered a recession, and experienced the second highest downturn among the G7
countries (G7 is a group consisting of the most developed countries in the world). Following another stagnation
during 2013, UK became the fastest growing developed economy [33]. Similar fluctuations, to those of UK,
manifested USA in both aggregated and disaggregated rankings (although in the aggregated rankings USA is
ranked slightly lower than UK since it is not as reliant on production of services). Indeed, USA’s economy
also showed nearly the same movements - it fell under a deep recession in 2008 and recovered relatively fast.
The differences between the complexity dynamics based on aggregated goods and services and the complexity
dynamics based only on (disaggregated) goods of UK and USA are even more pronounced when we compare our
aggregated complexity metrics (which account for both goods and services) to the ones calculated by only using
the SITC Rev.2 1-digit aggregated goods. Therefore, we argue that by including the services, the aggregated
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metrics present a more realistic picture about the long term potential displayed by these two countries.
The distinction between the rankings is even more pronounced when examining countries like Estonia
and Malaysia which have similar wealth and disaggregated rankings through the years, but different GDP
structure. Estonia’s economy relies heavily on services, whereas Malaysia’s is almost equally reliant on both
goods and services. As a consequence, Estonia is usually ranked far higher in the aggregated rankings, and has
experienced bigger rises and falls over the years. For comparison, at the same time Estonia averaged a bigger
yearly GDP per capita growth (4.99%, whilst Malaysia had 2.65%), had bigger standard deviation in it (7.07
to 4.34) and was eventually classified as advanced economy by IMF [34].
A separate type of countries are the natural resource exporters. According to Hausmann and Hidalgo [4],
some of these countries witnessed tremendous development over the years not because of their complex economy,
but because of the abundance of raw materials who do not require many capabilities to be produced. An
example of such a country is the United Arab Emirates, which is ranked relatively low in the rankings. The
aggregated ECI and IF rank UAE even lower in some years as the revealed comparative advantage that UAE
had in some complex products is lost by the aggregation of the data.
In agreement with all these observations, we argue that the aggregated metrics (with services included)
can be used as a better representation of the productive structure of some of the developed economies. We
base our argument on the fact that the examined countries (particularly USA and UK) were among the first
to experience the post-industrial transition from a manufacturing-based economy to a service-based economy
during the last few decades of the twentieth century [23]. This transition, characterized with a declining
manufacturing sector, yields an effective decrease of the complexity of a country, when estimated only by using
goods data.
While the same conclusions hold for some of the other developed countries, as in the case of Switzerland
for example, they appear to not be true for Germany, Japan and Italy. In fact, their rankings are reversed:
in the rankings based solely on goods they are among the most complex economies, whereas they are placed
on average lower in the rankings where services are included. We believe that this discrepancy is due to the
difference in the speed of transition. It is known that over the years, Germany, Japan and Italy had the lowest
increase in service employment among the developed countries [35], which implies that they preserved the
diversity in the goods sector and did not develop as diversified service sector as other developed countries.
On one side, it may be the case that economic complexity indices based only on goods are slightly biased
towards these type of economies. This could especially be true for Italy, a country which exhibits great
discrepancy in the rankings: in the aggregated country rankings it is always placed outside the top ten, meaning
that it definitely does not have as competitive service sector as other economies, and yet, according to the
disaggregated IF, is constantly among the five most complex countries. Actually, Italy’s economic system was
hit hard during the Great Recession and, consequently, this led to the nations Sovereign-Debt crisis. While this
fall in the long run potential can be predicted from the country’s movements in the aggregated IF rankings in
the late 2000s (See the next paragraph), it can not be, in any way, sensed from the disaggregated dynamics
(based solely on disaggregated goods data).
However, on the other side, it may also be that aggregated rankings which include services are biased towards
the economies with sophisticated service sector, as it is the example with the USA and, in particular, with UK.
More precise insights would definitely be obtained by performing an analysis based on finely disaggregated goods
and service data, something which is not possible due to current service nomenclature and data availability.
The PIIGS nations: PIIGS is a derogatory term which refers to the nations of: Portugal, Ireland, Italy,
Greece and Spain; five European Union member states that were unable to refinance their government debt or
to bail out over-indebted banks on their own during the Sovereign-Debt crisis of 2009. Their downturn was
discussed from an economic complexity perspective in [12]. According to the authors, the fragility of the PIIGS
is mostly of financial origin and is less related to their productive structure. They strengthen their argument
by pointing out that there are different regimes in the fitness-income plane, and that the PIIGS are in the one
where the developed nations are stationed. The economies in this regime are less reliant on their productive
structure for future growth since they already have a diversified goods export basket; i.e. they have saturated
their product space.
While we mostly agree with this argument, we would also like to investigate the possibility that the fragility
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of the PIIGS countries may be, to a certain extent, attributed to the structure of their service sector. To
obtain some further clues, in the following we concentrate on the economic complexity of these countries where
services are added in the model.
Fig. 6 illustrates the disaggregated and aggregated dynamics of the PIIGS countries. Even though the
aggregated ECI and IF dynamics (Fig. 6b and Fig. 6d) moderately match their disaggregated counterparts
(Fig. 6a and Fig. 6c) with the ”partially” stable (ranking) movements of Portugal, Italy and Spain, there
are some significant differences in the movements of the other countries. For example, Greece has very big
fluctuations which lead to a dramatic drop in its complexity in the period of 2009-10 (if we examine only the
aggregated IF, the same conclusions hold for Italy). Additionally, in contrast to [12], our aggregated rankings
reveal that Ireland has greatly transformed its productive structure and is presently one of the most complex
economies. We believe that these dynamics explain better the long term economic expectations of the PIIGS
nations than the projections based solely on goods data. As a matter of fact, Ireland was the first country to
exit its bailout program by the end of 2013 [36], and in the following years experienced significant economic
growth. On the other hand, the economy of Greece did not experience the same improvements and, as of 2016,
is yet to make its full recovery; the country was even reclassified as an emerging market by some equity index
providers [37].
It should be emphasized that we do not dispute the fact that the PIIGS crisis may be attributed, at least in
part, to the structural problems in the countries’ economic systems and the inflexibility of their policies. In
addition, as the authors in [8] argue, different regimes may exist for the economic complexity leading to the
there introduced Selective Predictability model. Instead, we provide an additional explanation for the recent
Fig 6. Dynamics of the PIIGS nations (1995-2010). a) ECI rankings movement b) Same for
aggregated ECI. c) IF rankings movement d) Same for aggregated IF. a-d Three digit iso codes are used as
country abbreviations.
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economic situation in these countries. In particular, we address the re-emergence of Ireland’s economy and the
ongoing stagnation of Greece. Unlike Ireland, which over the years managed to include more complex services
to its product portfolio, Greece maintained its service productivity only in industries such as shipping and
tourism. These services, respectively included under EBOPS 205: Transportation and EBOPS 236: Travel
in our aggregated classification, not only rank lower on the product complexity scale, but also show to be
especially sensitive to financial crises.
Conclusion
We investigated the impact of services on the countries’ productive structure in the context of the recently
developed theory of economic complexity. By including service data and aggregating goods data (to make it
comparable to the service data), we introduced aggregated indices as measures for the complexity of products
(here denoting both goods and services) and their producers (i.e. countries).
Similar to previous works dealing with economic complexity, we described the relations between countries
and products they export via a bipartite network (graph), along with the thereby associated country-product
(adjacency) matrix, with the difference that the adjacency matrix was now derived from aggregated goods
and service data. The complexity measures were obtained by using two standard algorithms for evaluating
complexity - the (linear) method of reflections (MR) due to Hidalgo and Hausmann, and the (nonlinear)
fitness-complexity method (FCM) due to Tachella et al. While the application of the MR method to the
aggregated goods and service data was straightforward, the direct application of the FCM method faced
the problem of convergence of some of the (country) fitness and (product) complexity scores to zero values,
effectively distorting the ranking picture. This came as result of the ”unfavorable shape” of the country-product
matrix (as derived from real trade data), which is along the lines of the results in [15] and [16], which relate the
convergence of the fitness and complexity scores obtained from the FCM method to the shape of the underlying
country-product matrix. To deal with this issue, we proposed a modification of the fitness-complexity method,
which may be interpreted as a second order approximation of the original FCM. We thereby proved that, with
the modification in place, the complexity indices (both for countries and products) converge to values strictly
greater than zero.
Our analysis showed that, although some information was inevitably lost in the process of aggregation,
the inclusion of services in the model provided new insights for both countries and products. Importantly,
the statistically significant relationship between the complexity measures and the economic growth remained
even with the aggregated product nomenclature (including goods and services). Nonetheless, these aggregated
metrics are not as good explanatory variables of growth as their disaggregated versions. Indeed, although
we add service information, due to the aggregation we now extract less information about the productive
capabilities embedded in the goods. Regardless of that, the aggregation still allows us to correctly grasp the
differences between the complexity of goods and services. Importantly, we discovered that services are, on
average, more complex than goods, with some services topping the overall product rankings. Given the premise
of a capability-driven productive structure, we conclude that sophisticated services require far more capabilities
as a means to be produced, as compared to goods.
Next, we investigated the impact that the inclusion of services has on the overall structure of the country
rankings. We concluded that the addition of the service exports in the model increased the complexity of
economies with developed service sector. Following standard interpretation which relates economic complexity
with the potential for future growth, conjectured that the economies whose export basket, includes (sophisticated)
services have bigger long-term growth potential as opposed to economies centered on export of goods.
However, we also discovered that the newly obtained aggregated country dynamics experience bigger changes
over the years when compared to the disaggregated ones. While this effect may be attributed in part to the
aggregation of goods data, the large volatility of the rankings after 2008 suggests that the Financial Crisis
of 2007-08 and the following recession had a drastic impact on the country and product complexity scores.
As a result, it may be argued that the aggregated metrics are more susceptible to (financial) economic crises
(as compared to their disaggregated version which is based on disaggregated goods data), resulting in more
frequent but also bigger changes in the rankings. One interpretation of this phenomenon would be that in
light of financial crises, most goods and sophisticated services (such as financial, which are usually the most
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complex services according to our model) are subject to a major decrease in trade, thus significantly affecting
complexity indices and country rankings. In addition, it may be argued that the restrictive trade measures
introduced in the countries during the recession affect services differently (as compared to goods). Nevertheless,
the investigated country dynamics suggests that the countries with sophisticated service sector succeeded to
exit recession relatively quickly, which also speaks for their (relative) robustness on long term. This is true for
example for the UK and the USA economy, and in particular, for Ireland which was the first country to exit its
bailout program by the end of 2013, and experienced a significant economic growth afterwards.
Lastly, by producing a country specific analysis, we argued that the model with services yields economic
complexity measures which, for some countries, are more consistent with their ”perceived” economic situation,
as otherwise suggested by an analysis performed solely on disaggregated exported goods. Examples include the
countries with developed service sectors (USA, UK and Estonia) and, in particular, the PIIGS countries where
these metrics provide additional information in light of their Sovereign-Debt crisis.
A more detailed analysis is certainly needed to further uncover the effects of services on the complexity
structure of the countries. This, however, requires a highly accurate and disaggregated service data which is
currently not available. Another fruitful research direction would be to fully exploit the concept which relates
products (goods and services) with the capabilities required for their production. Building an explanatory
model for the underlying capabilities would bring novel insights about the relations between products in the
product space and, importantly, about the productive knowledge embedded in a country’s economy. This is a
subject of our current work.
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Supporting Information S1: The Impact of Services on Economic Complexity:
Service Sophistication as Route for Economic Growth
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1 Growth regressions: Robustness Check
We check the robustness of our econometric results by constructing a regression in which we exclude the period fixed
effect, and by making three new regressions in which we introduce the initial export of goods and services (GS) as a
percent of total GDP; the initial population; and the initial value added of services as a percent of total GDP (SVD) in
the model. By excluding the period fixed effect we do not allow for changes in the average value of growth over time [1].
On the other hand, by including the aforementioned variables we account for possible effects of the trade openness, the
size of the country and the magnitude of the service sector over growth. As stated in [2], for population, these variables
may be interpreted as capabilities, and thus be correlated with the aggregated complexity measures. This implies that
we might run into the problem of multicolinearity - failure to indicate significance of the correlated variables in the
proposed model. Nonetheless, as presented in Table S1 1, the aggregated complexity measures pass the test as significant
predictors of long term economic even when discounting the period effect and adding the three other variables.
2 Alternative RCA representation/Concatenated metrics
Production of raw materials, manufactured goods and services are three separate processes of the economy (equivalent to
the primary, secondary and tertiary sector of the economy). One may argue, due to often having vanishing fixed costs,
that services have distinct export features, when compared to manufactured goods and raw materials whose cost of
production can more easily be attributed to their corresponding export values. In this sense, export might no longer be
an adequate presentation of the internal structure of the productive system of a country. In addition, as services may be
a dominant part of some economic systems, their inclusion in the model might provide bias towards service-oriented
economies. On the other hand, in spite of the potential drawbacks, it still may be argued that the concept of Revealed
Comparative Advantage [3] is structured in a way that it still accounts for the varying export costs and export volumes
among products (be it services and goods). With the aim to investigate these issues to more detail, here we consider an
alternative representation where the RCA indices for services are calculated separately from the RCA indices for goods:
RCAis =
Eis/
∑
sEis∑
iEis/
∑
i,sEis
RCAjg =
Ejg/
∑
g Ejg∑
j Ejg/
∑
j,g Ejg
where s ∈ {1, . . . , S} and g ∈ {1, . . . , G}, with S and G denoting the number of services, respectively goods, in the
model based on aggregated goods data. Afterwards, these indices are combined to construct the M matrix, from which
”concatenated complexity measures” (i.e. ECI/linear PCI and Fitness/nonlinear PCI) are derived.
It can be argued that with this representation one effectively ”divides” the economic system of a country into two
sectors - services and goods. This may bias the results because when constructing the M matrix equal weights are given
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to the overall exports of services and goods, thus potentially failing to acknowledge the initial differences in the nature
and magnitude of their production. Moreover, it can be argued, that with this we slightly move away from the notion of
Economic Complexity, since we implicitly assume that capabilities diffuse separately between goods and services (under
the premise of a capability-driven interpretation of the country’s productive structure).
In Table S1 2 we reproduce the growth regressions with the concatenated complexity metrics. Column I states that
the concatenated diversity is not a significant predictor of growth, whereas from columns II and IV we conclude that, on
5% level, the concatenated ECI and the concatenated IF significantly explain long term growth. When the models are
compared, the the concatenated IF clearly outperforms the concatenated diversity, while the insignificance of the later
in its individual model leads to insignificance of the model where we compare it to the concatenated ECI. As a means
to infer which model performs better (whether the model with the concatenated ECI or the concatenated diversity)
we must opt for another method for choosing between variables, such as the Information criterions. We estimated the
Hannan-Quinn, Akaike and the Bayesian Information Criterion (not shown here, but available in the workfile and/or by
request) and all of them prefer the model with the concatenated ECI.
Furthermore, in Fig S1 1 we provide the yearly correlation between the aggregated complexity measures and the
concatenated complexity measures based on aggregated data. Both, linear and nonlinear, aggregated and concatenated
metrics have relatively high Spearman correlation over the years. Only after 2006 their correlation gradually declines and
it ranges around 0.6 until the end of the period under investigation.
Finally, in Fig S1 2 we show the yearly Spearman correlation between the disaggregated complexity measures and
the concatenated complexity measures. These correlations are very similar to those presented in Fig 3 of the main
manuscript, with only minor changes. In this figure in particular, in almost every year, and for both type of metrics
(linear and nonlinear), the relations are relatively weaker. Only in the last two years (2009 and 2010), the correlation
between the disaggregated and concatenated ECI does not fall as much as that for the disaggregated and aggregated
ECI. On the other hand, the correlation between the disaggregated and concatenated IF is by far weaker than the one
estimated for the disaggregated and aggregated IF.
The comparisons between the results presented in Fig 3 of the main manuscript and Fig S1 2, can serve as a
quantitative indicator for the conclusion that the aggregated measures, with the apparent drawback, are still a better
approximation of the productive structure embedded in the goods and in the services and, as such, better indicators for
the complexity of countries and products in the economic complexity terminology.
Table S1 2. Concatenated Complexity Metrics and Growth
Dependent Variable: Growth in GDP pc
1988-1998, 1998-2008
Variable (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Income per capita, logs −0.032∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Increase in NR exports 0.303∗ 0.318∗ 0.318∗ 0.302∗ 0.300∗
(0.165) (0.167) (0.167) (0.164) (0.167)
COI 0.003∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.004∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
concatenated ECI 0.033∗∗ 0.031
(0.016) (0.019)
concatenated IF, logs 0.034∗∗ 0.070∗
(0.016) (0.040)
concatenated Diversity 0.008 0.001 −0.015
(0.006) (0.008) (0.014)
Constant 0.508∗∗∗ 0.562∗∗∗ 0.562∗∗∗ 0.626∗∗∗ 0.729∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.126) (0.127) (0.138) (0.172)
Observations 210 210 210 210 210
R2 0.222 0.232 0.232 0.230 0.234
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors clustered by cross-section shown in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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Fig S1 1. Correlation between the aggregated and concatenated metrics. a) Yearly Spearman correlation
between the aggregated and concatenated ECI (estimated through MR). b) same as a) for the aggregated and
concatenated IF (estimated through M-FCM).
Fig S1 2. Correlation between the disaggregated and concatenated metrics. a) Yearly Spearman correlation
between the disaggregated and concatenated ECI (estimated through MR). b) same as a) for the disaggregated and
concatenated IF (estimated through M-FCM).
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